Abstract: Estonia is seen as a remarkable success story in the context of e-government. Several studies that have mapped the major factors affecting the evolution of e-government in Estonia are mainly grounded in information systems theory; even if competencies of the private sector and public-private partnerships are examined, their treatment remains too general. The current article argues for the importance of the innovation system approach and public procurement for innovation-examining what has widely taken place, namely, the purchasing of e-government solutions that did not yet exist at the time but that were developed within a reasonable period. Several technological risks related to public procurement for innovation were avoided due to the high competencies of local suppliers, a lack of legacy infrastructure, and a supportive environment for 'ethical hackers'. The importance of the framework and the success factors is illustrated by a case study on e-voting.
Introduction
In terms of available online public services, Estonia is considered advanced and sophisticated (e.g., Capgemini, 2007) . All public services in Estonia include an e-service component. In particular, all state and local government agencies, persons in public law, as well as persons in private law performing public law functions must accept digitally signed documents. Since their introduction in 2002, digital signatures have been employed by 250,000 users for signing contracts, applications, transaction orders, etc. (Certification Centre, 2009 ).
Estonia is also one of the world's leaders in e-filing of tax returns and other declarations. A total of 583,453 income-tax returns were submitted to the tax authority by private individuals in 2008; 90% of these came in through the electronic Tax Board system, compared to 76% in and 59% in 2003 (Estonian Tax and Customs Board, 2009 ).
Estonian achievements are also notable in e-voting, one of the most ambitious fields of application for e-government. Estonia has implemented remote Internet-based voting in several nationwide elections: local government elections (2005) In addition to the popularity of Internet-based public services, Estonia is well known in the field of mobile value-added services (m-services). Estonia was the first country in the world to have mobile positioning in commercial use and one of the first to have 112-emergency calls linked with a mobile positioning system that can determine the origin of each call. In fact, since 2000 Estonians can pay for car parking via their mobile phones (see Rannu, 2003) . Other public administrations, Tartu City in particular, have also paid remarkable attention to the development of m-services (see Rannu and Semevsky, 2005) .
These developments have captured the attention of international audiences, especially in developing countries interested in following the Estonian path. However, relatively few studies focus on the factors that enabled the success of Estonian e-government.
Based on interviews as well as on secondary sources, this article seeks to explain success factors of e-government in Estonia. Estonia's experience is documented through examination of studies that analyse success factors; section two relates Estonian developments in egovernment to them. In section three, an additional viewpoint is offered-that of innovation and public procurement for innovation-along with analysis of other key success factors, without which understanding the success of Estonian e-government would be incomplete. Section four illustrates the new research framework with the case of e-voting in Estonia.
Success factors of Estonian e-government: literature review
The literature is ample on e-government and the success factors related to it, including case studies. Basically, two major approaches can be distinguished and related to studies of Estonia.
One research stream follows from an understanding that e-government is a "spin-off from electronic commerce" (Ramnarine and Endeley, 2008) and is thus basically the application of ICT in the public sector, using e-commerce as a role model. This approach comes from informatics-information systems, library and information studies, and computer science (Heeks and Bailur, 2007) . However, many researchers conclude, including Yildiz (2007) , that the study of e-government lacks a more in-depth analysis of the political nature of its development processes and a deeper recognition of the surrounding complex political and institutional environments; it is suggested that the subject of e-government be more strongly tied to mainstream public administration research and a wider social and economic context (e.g., Dunleavy et al., 2008; Homburg, 2008) . Still, most studies on e-government success factors are derived from information systems research and e-commerce applications, while theories of state are hardly represented. One recent attempt to combine both concepts is an extensive study by Eynon (2007) that identifies the following categories of barriers that can block or constrain e-government progress: leadership failures, financial inhibitors, digital divides and choices, poor coordination, workplace and organizational inflexibility, lack of trust, and poor technical design. An extensive literature overview by Gil-Garcia and Pardo (2005) also conclude that next to strategies examining ICT and data, and organizational and managerial aspects, it is important to focus on other key success factors, including legal and regulatory matters and wider institutional issues (for extension and application, see also Ghapanchi et al., 2008) .
Many potential barriers identified in the theoretical literature have been addressed and explicitly characterised as success factors of Estonian e-government (Table 1) .
Table 1 Success factors of Estonian e-government in various studies
First, studies show that enthusiastic and visionary civil servants were behind the development of information systems in the public sector. The World Bank (2006) study demonstrates the importance of "informal coordination" and "coaching", stating that "Estonia has followed a consistent policy towards the introduction of e-governance over much of the last decade, and even if there is no strong top-down coordination system in place to ensure that this strategic goal is followed through, the introduction of e-government solutions has been consistent across the board" (p.41). Another study argues that a very pragmatic approach can be observed in Estonian e-government development: it is based more on development-driven strategies than on strategy-driven development, meaning some central information systems and applications have been developed by technocrats without the existence or guidance of respective policies and action plans (Kalvet and Aaviksoo, 2008, p.52 ). This viewpoint is in contrast to the conclusions of Ernsdorff and Berbec (2007) who state that an important factor in Estonia's accelerated emergence as a digital leader was the commitment by politicians to focus holistically on a programme of e-government within public operations and democratic institutions on the one hand and across the marketplace and civil society on the other hand.
Second, Estonia has been often reported as a country with a favourable legislative environment towards ICT (for a comprehensive overview of the development of egovernment in Estonia, see Kalvet and Aaviksoo, 2008) . Although there is currently no specific e-government law in Estonia, the most important aspects are covered in different legislative acts that provide for the use of the Internet in administrative affairs. For instance, the Public Information Act was approved in 2000, guaranteeing electronic access to public information (including draft legislation) and electronic communication. Other very important legal acts were approved early as well (e.g., the Digital Signatures Act of 2000).
Third, stable funding was provided for ICT expenditures in 1993-2005 (excluding personnelrelated costs, ICT expenditure has been ca 1% of the total state budget). The development of ICT infrastructure in the public sector started very early during Estonia's re-establishment as an independent state and has been very successful. As of 2005, for example, 99% of the computers of central government organisations were connected (mostly via broadband) to the Internet. Most studies emphasise the importance of two major (horizontal) projects that form the basis of Estonian e-government. Namely, government information systems and databases have been connected via the Internet through a service known as the 'X-Road'-the implementation of unified interfaces for different existing databases and a data-exchange layer that allows officials as well as legal entities and private individuals to process data from national databases over the Internet within the limits of their authority. Another factor critical to the success of e-government was the adoption of the Estonian ID-card-a compulsory identity document for all citizens that includes electronic authentication and authorization mechanisms.
When it comes to private sector competencies and its co-operation with the public sector, the focus is mostly on the role of banks and telecommunication operators. The importance of the Estonian banking sector as a generator of expectations regarding government e-services and as a general catalyst for e-government has been emphasised by many researchers. Banks have been identified as the 'informal' leaders of the Estonian software industry and banks have generated overall trust towards ICT due to their successful implementation of Internet banking services. In addition, banks offer authentication services to access various publicsector e-services (see Kalvet and Aaviksoo, 2008) . Banks and telecom operators have also been behind several large-scale initiatives aimed at information-society development, e.g., Look@World Foundation (see Kalvet 2007, p.27-28) . The activities of other nongovernmental organisations have also caused or acted as catalysts for the emergence of a number of e-government services. For example, the work of the George Soros-funded NGO, Open Estonia Foundation, in the late 1990s resulted in the very first versions of the now-verypopular citizen portal, the online posting of all Estonian legislation as well as a variety of administrative forms. The work of the foundation created further public expectations (Kalvet and Aaviksoo, 2008, p.89) .
In sum, the analysis of Estonian e-government is inclined to depart from the informaticsbased perspective and emphasise developments within the public sector as key success factors. Even if private sector competencies and public-private partnerships are examined, the analysis remains too general. Kitsing (2008, p.430 ) also concludes, "the causal explanation for understanding the evolution of the electronic government services to public needs to incorporate the private sector agents who unintentionally contributed to the provision of egovernment services". The following section argues that private sector competencies and public procurement for innovation, the mechanism applied to develop e-government, have been of utmost importance.
Success factors of Estonian e-government: innovation viewpoint

National innovation system and e-government
The most widespread definition of innovation originates with Schumpeter (1934, p.66) . With slight modification, it is also used by international organizations like the OECD, the European Commission, and others. Perhaps the best-known formulation is as follows: "An innovation is the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organisational method in business practices, workplace organisation or external relations" (OECD and Eurostat 2005, p.46) . Innovations are produced by entrepreneurs, but they are not inventors; rather, they are people who decide to allocate resources for the exploitation of an invention (Schumpeter 1934) . Consequently, for any technological change to be considered an innovation, it must be commercially exploited: the product or service actually has to appear in the market or a new process has to be implemented. While there are studies applying this approach directly to the public sector (called "public sector innovation", e.g., Altschuler and Behn, 1997; Mulgan and Albury, 2003) , the public sector should be seen instead as an implementer (and possibly also a facilitator) of innovations that are supplied by the private sector (Kattel and Vask, 2008) .
The concept of a national innovation system (NIS) encompasses the most-developed theoretical and policymaking discourse about innovation. The factors that influence innovation processes have been mapped within NIS studies, which include the network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify, and diffuse new technologies (Freeman, 1987, p.1) . Another seminal study by Lundvall (1992) places interactive learning and user-producer interaction at the centre of the analysis. Edquist (2005) has also done extensive work to map activities that occur within NIS. The first set of activities relate to knowledge inputs to the innovation process, which include provision of R&D and creation of new knowledge and competence building through educating and training. Demand-side activities refer to the formation of new product markets and the articulation of quality requirements related to the new products. Third, NIS is about creating and changing organizations, developing new fields of innovation, networking through markets and other mechanisms, including interactive learning among different organizations, and creating and changing institutions (e.g., laws, regulations, R&D investment routines). Finally, support services for innovating firms include incubation activities, financial support, and consultancy services. These activities can be considered to be determinants of the development and diffusion of innovations. Thus, innovation research puts considerable emphasis on different actors, including their capabilities and competencies; interplay among those actors, or positive feedback linkages, is crucial for innovation to succeed.
Existing empirical studies confirm the importance of such systemic interplay in the case of Estonian information society developments-the telecommunications sector, banking, wholesale and retail trade, and governmental structures have been identified as the important drivers of the Estonian ICT-sector innovation system. Governmental structures have been important users of telecommunications equipment and services, office machinery, computers and software; whereas, the government's affection for novel technological solutions has had a positive effect on a number of public-sector initiatives (Kalvet et al., 2002) . Another comprehensive analysis can be found in a study by Högselius (2005) where the Estonian telecommunications system of innovation is bundled with developments in other fields, especially banking and e-government. While the primary focus of the study is innovation in the telecommunications sector and not in e-government, the study concludes, "in the years around 2000 Estonia saw a virtual explosion of activities related to the creation of new service products, many of which did not exist anywhere else in the world" (p.277), driven by farreaching networking activities between different actors.
Although relatively few studies are available that look at Estonian e-government from an NIS perspective, the existing evidence is convincing in showing the importance of wider economic and social factors to explain the success in technological change. Although further research is needed on the various aspects that influence activities taking place within NIS-including (higher) education policy, provision of R&D grants-what seems to be most important in the case of e-government is to look at the demand-side activities of the public sector. Thus, in the following, the relationships between the public and private sectors and the mechanisms used to transfer new technologies to the public sector are analysed.
Public procurement for innovation
The most concrete way to operationalise demand-side activities in the NIS approach and to relate e-government with innovation is through the concept of public procurement for innovation, which occurs "when a public agency places an order for a product or system which does not yet exist at the time, but which could (probably) be developed within a reasonable period. Additional or new technological development work is required to fulfil the demands of the buyer" (Edquist and Hommen, 2000, p.5) . Hence, unlike the regular procurement process, where governments place orders for ready-made or 'off-the-shelf' products, procurement for innovation involves ordering products that might need additional R&D work and may pose risks both to the procurer and the supplier. The potentially more important role of public procurement for innovation within the innovation policy mix has recently re-emerged in academic discussion (e.g., Edquist and Hommen, 1999; Cabral et al., 2006; Edler and Georghiou, 2007; Rolfstam, 2009; Uyarra and Flanagan, 2010) Nyiri et al., 2007; ECEG, 2010; Lember et al., 2010) .
This framework becomes especially relevant considering the fact that a large share of Estonian e-government development work is accomplished outside the public sector and can be characterised as an application of public procurement for innovation. The previously mentioned two major (horizontal) strategic projects that form the basis of Estonian egovernment-'X-Road' and the Estonian ID card-were both purchased through public procurement in 2001 (Högselius, 2005, pp.234-238) . Both procurements are examples of government initiation, but the purchased products or services are used widely by other endusers for the introduction of other innovative products and services, driving the clustering among innovation-system actors even further.
It is widely agreed that public procurement for innovation entails risks (Nyiri et al., 2007; ECEG, 2010) . Risk results "from the direct and indirect adverse consequences of outcomes and events that were not accounted for or that were ill prepared for, and concerns their effects on individuals, firms or society at large. It can result from many reasons both internally induced and occurring externally with their effects felt internally" (Kogan & Tapiero, 2007, p.378) . Based on a review of academic literature and case studies related to public procurement for innovation, ECEG (2010) identified several types of risks. Some of the organisational risks (related to failures or under-delivery for reasons situated within the organisation that procures) or the financial risks (related to the ability to secure the funds needed in the first place) have been well managed by Estonian public administration through identified success factors like adequate funding and regulatory support.
The technological risks and their management through public-private partnerships and private sector competencies have received less attention in discussions of Estonian e-government success (with the exception of Högselius, 2005) . Technological risks are those risks that lead to non-completion, under-performance or false performance of the procured service or product for reasons that lie within the technical operation. Technological risks, for example, could arise from suppliers (1) not finding the solutions as promised, (2) choosing the wrong or a suboptimal technology (it does not work as expected or is not fit for the purpose, does not match standards, etc.), (3) choosing a technology prematurely, (4) failing to acknowledge technological incompatibilities, (5) failing to develop the solution in-house, or (6) failing to buy components and knowledge as claimed in the tender process. Contract design is one of the specific risk-management methods used to manage technological risk. Different contractual modes offer varying incentives for the contractor to deliver quality and not to run excessive costs; a more general recommendation is to ensure 'early supplier involvement' and to check for supplier capacity constraints through measures such as sharing future demand developments with potential suppliers early on, providing in-house market intelligence to screen potential suppliers, etc. (ECEG, 2010) . Indeed, two related and specific aspects of the local ICT sector and of public procurement for innovation deserve further elaboration as they have helped minimize the technological risks and enabled the success of public procurements for e-government solutions.
Path dependency and creative destruction
One of the concerns of public procurement for innovation is caused by a supplier's inability to deliver or having a lock-in towards outdated technological platforms. Namely, path dependency and creative destruction refer to two opposite conditions for innovation. On the one hand, competencies obtained in the past lead to an accumulation process and pathdependent developments; technological innovation requires a merging of pre-existing explicit and tacit knowledge bases and various sources of practical experience (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Arthur, 1994) . On the other hand, innovations and technological change often work through a process that Schumpeter described as creative destruction, where new products, activities, jobs, and industries are created and old ones evaporate (Schumpeter, 1934) . These related problems generally did not materialise in the procurement of the Estonian egovernment solutions, mainly due to local circumstances and the high competency levels of local suppliers.
First, compared to other former Soviet Republics, Estonia had the advantage of having considerable ICT competencies. Almost all former state-owned organisations had their computing centre, while Tallinn University of Technology and the University of Tartu both provided good ICT education . One of the key R&D centres is Cybernetica AS, established in 1997 as a spin-off of the Institute of Cybernetics of Tallinn University of Technology. It deals with information security such as communications security products and digital signature technology. Cybernetica developed the main e-government solutions used in Estonia. For example, Estonian e-voting became possible only because several critical enabling technologies were in place, such as the nationwide Public Key Infrastructure for providing voter authentication through the national ID card, and X-Road, a secure information exchange layer seamlessly binding all governmental databases-all of which were created in cooperation with Cybernetica (Kalvet, 2009) . Also, the Institute of Cybernetics of Tallinn University of Technology played key role in the development of Estonian e-government. In addition, many software companies actively partnered with public institutions in the development of innovation solutions, e.g., Abobase Systems AS, AS Datel, AS Cell Networks, MicroLink Eesti AS, Real Systems AS, AS Regio and AS Webmedia (Kalvet, 2004; Högselius, 2005) . Second, the transfer to modern Internet-based technological platforms was made easier by the fact that the technological base in all sectors was built up basically from zero. Högselius (2007a, p.6) contrasts the rapid development of Internet banking in Estonia with the relatively slower developments in Western countries: "The reason was obviously that the already existing, though technologically outdated alternatives had very deep roots in the daily routines of the masses and that they were seen to function smoothly, i.e., there was no radical need for improvement from the perspective of the users".
Hacker ethics
A general culture supportive of innovation and ICT can be crucial for the emergence of ICTenabled applications and services. The concept of a 'hacker ethic' reflects a wish by ICT workers to realise creative passion, a wish to constantly surpass themselves, to produce creative work as a result of their actions in the field (Levy, 1984; Himanen, 2001 ). This approach is similar to Schumpeter's (1934, p.93 ) explanation of an entrepreneur, whose motives are more complex than profit maximisation and may include "the dream and the will to found a private kingdom, usually, though not necessarily, also a dynasty," and the "will to conquer: the impulse to fight, to prove oneself superior to others, to succeed for the sake, not of the fruits of success, but of success itself," and/or the "joy of creating, of getting things done, or simply of exercising one's energy and ingenuity".
In their analyses of Finnish information society developments from this perspective, Castells and Himanen (2002) conclude that those 'ethical hackers' were provided with opportunities to implement their solutions, both in the public as well as private sectors, and their activities were crucial for the emergence of the Finnish information society.
This conclusion also applies to Estonian e-government: such individuals from different sectors-including public, private, and the non-governmental sector-have played crucial roles in allowing Estonian e-government to emerge and flourish. For example, the emergence of Internet banking in Hansabank was the result of enthusiastic employees who developed the Internet bank, working days and nights, on their own initiative rather than as the result of systematic R&D (Kalvet, 2006, pp.81-83) . Högselius (2007b, p.68) describes the emergence of the E-tax board: "The planned services did not exist anywhere else in the world at that time, but there was considerable expertise available in Estonia with regard to the closely related field of Internet banking solutions. The main inspiration thus came from the local Estonian banks, rather than any existing applications of tax boards in neighbouring or other foreign countries". Estonian e-voting has been also driven by a few technologically enthusiastic ICT experts as described below.
Public procurement for innovation: the case of e-voting in Estonia
There has been an e-voting (as remote Internet-based voting) opportunity in all elections in Estonia since 2005, and all major assessment reports consider Estonian e-voting generally successful (see Madise et al., 2005; Breuer and Trechsel, 2006; Trechsel et al., 2007) . From any location, the voter only needs the following to be able to vote online: an Estonian ID-card with valid certificates and PIN codes; a computer with a smart-card reader and relevant software; an Internet connection; and a Windows, MacOS, or Linux operating system (NEC, 2005) . Voters can change their vote several times, but only the final vote is counted. The election laws stipulate that e-voting must take place from 4 to 10 days before Election Day. The remaining time is needed to prepare the list of voters, which also shows those who have already voted electronically, thus avoiding double or multiple voting. The law also states that a traditional, onsite vote has priority over a remote e-vote.
The e-voting software was purchased as a result of public procurement in 2004. E-voting demands complicated risk management-involving technological, institutional (legal and political), and societal risks-and can, as such, be considered one of the most, if not the most, ambitious applications of e-government. Estonia's e-voting success story, particularly in terms of its technological solutions, lies in the country's explicit and effective risk management: addressing all expected risks by enhancing the capacities of the procurer, carrying out in-depth risk analyses, and endeavouring to generate trust through consistent dialogue and openness (Kalvet, 2009 ).
In the current context it is important to emphasize, first, that the idea and the concept for the introduction of Internet-based remote voting in Estonia came from ICT security specialists. Those people with a wish to realise their creative passion, a wish to constantly surpass themselves, and to show to the world that this can be done were the first to introduce the idea to the stakeholders and to continuously stand behind it. Those experts were also very aware of the security risks related to Internet voting. An analytical document prepared before the procurement of the software addressed all these issues (see Ansper et al., 2003) . Even ICT experts not directly involved in the implementation of the projects were, at the least, widely involved, consulted, and their opinions considered in order to prevent their possible incountry opposition.
Second, the procuring organisation set tight technical requirements for the system and requested high-level competencies from the supplier. To qualify for participation in the procurement, expertise in cryptographic solutions and work in line with the methodology "Rational Unified Process" were needed (NEC, 2004) . The procurement was awarded to Cybernetica AS, with 114 employees, a local R&D company, active in ICT. As noted earlier, they had considerable competencies and had participated in the launching of major Estonian public-sector ICT projects.
So, 'ethical hackers' pushed the public administration apparatus to think about the introduction of an innovative e-government solution. Due to the considerable competencies in the private sector and the existence of proper ICT infrastructure, its implementation became visible and potential technological failures related to the procurement were avoided.
Conclusions
Estonia is, in the context of e-government, seen as a remarkable success story and has thus captured the interest of international audiences and, especially, developing countries. At the same time, studies of the success factors remain limited. Some of the studies that have mapped the major factors that affected as well as contributed to the evolution of e-government in Estonia are derived from information systems research. Those studies argue that public sector competencies and leadership, adequate funding and legislative support, and the development of information technology infrastructure have been the critical success factors. Others suggest taking wider perspective that includes social and economic factors. However, even if the competencies of the private sector and public-private partnerships are identified as important factors, their treatment remains too general.
The current papers argues that analysis of Estonian e-government should be expanded with a more detailed look at the success factors relating to the supplier side and transfer instruments. The most fruitful way to look at e-government is from the public procurement of innovation perspective, examining the purchase of e-government solutions that did not yet exist at the time but which were developed within a reasonable period (and occasionally included R&D). Such activity entails different risks. While the management of organisational and financial risks is addressed in earlier literature (the following being important measures to address those risks -public sector competencies and leadership, adequate funding, legislative support), the management of technological risks, and especially their management through the publicprivate partnerships and the private sector competencies, have received less attention in the discussions of Estonian e-government success. The current paper concludes that private sector competencies and the contribution of 'ethical hackers' have been important to the emergence and development of Estonian e-government, as both are crucial for managing risks related to technology failures in public procurement for innovation. The case study on the emergence of e-voting clearly illustrates the importance of those two factors. Also, Estonia has had success with the types of public procurement selected, as the mechanisms chosen have resulted in considerable spillovers and additional positive developments in the private sector (X-Road solution and public key infrastructure with ID cards are both excellent and influential examples).
The success of Estonian e-government adds additional perspectives to research on small states and innovation. While small states are usually attributed with weaknesses as far as innovation is concerned (see Kattel et al., 2010 , for discussion), the small size of a country does not necessarily hinder innovation, especially in the case of incremental innovations such as innovation in e-government services.
Although further research is needed on various aspects of public procurement for innovation, including on the selection of the most proper procurement instruments and risk management, the findings of the current research fully support the Estonian policy towards public procurement for innovation: "State orders constitute a considerable part of the ICT sector's turnover. However, in public procurements the determining factor usually tends to be the price, which is why the private sector often lacks motivation to offer the best solutions. By becoming a smart customer, the public sector can, in addition to meeting its own needs better than so far, contribute to the development of competitive products and services that could be marketed abroad" (Government of Estonia, 2006, p.10) .
